I. INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNINGS FOR COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS-BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
Supervisory colleges were not first created as a result of the current financial crisis. Financial supervisors have previously formed these groups to monitor financial institutions with cross-border operations. 10 In the late 1980s, a college of supervisors, including supervisory authorities from the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and other European nations, supervised the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI"), a bank with operations in several dozen countries. 11 However, this college proved ineffective as the bank was ultimately liquidated because of internal fraudulent activities.12
In a coordinated action on July 5, 1991, regulators in eight nations closed all the BCCI branches located within their jurisdictions.13 At the time BCCI had total assets of approximately $20 billion and was operating in sixty-nine countries, with the largest concentration of its deposits in the United Kingdom.14 Due to the absence of any international law governing the closure of an international bank, local regulators acted under separate national laws. 15 By July 6, 1991, BCCI offices in eighteen countries either were closed or their operations were restricted. 16 The closure of BCCI branches continued for several weeks, and by July 29, 1991, forty-four jurisdictions had closed BCCI offices located within their borders. The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the Bank of England's receipt of a June 1991 report prepared by Price Waterhouse, the international accounting firm, which detailed massive fraud committed by BCCI's senior managers.
10 See id. at 97. Is Id. Through the mid-1980s, the treasury operations of BCCI suffered huge losses. Id. Senior managers siphoned off deposits to cover these losses. If the depositors withdrew their money, then other deposits were diverted to cover the losses. Id. This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent transactions. Id. The report revealed that senior managers, board members, and representatives of major shareholders participated in the fraud by making fictitious loans, failing to record deposits, and dealing in their own shares in order to manufacture profits. Id. BCCI also used client names to trade on its own account. Id. BCCI managers hid the losses caused by bad trades, unpaid loans, and fraudulent practices by shuttling assets between subsidiaries. Id. In 1988 alone, BCCI subsidiaries paid each other $152 million in fee income. Id. Price Waterhouse is the Regulators in both the United States and England had been concerned about the safety and soundness of BCCI for years before the bank was finally closed.19 In February 1990, Price Waterhouse, BCCI's auditor, refused to sign off on the BCCI financial statements for 1989 and subsequently reported to the BCCI board and the Bank of England its concerns of fraud at BCCI.
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2 0 In April 1990, the Bank of England permitted the government of Abu Dhabi to increase its investment in BCCI-in effect to bail out the bank. 21 Six months later, in October 1990, Price Waterhouse delivered to the BCCI board a follow-up to its 22 April report, detailing the bank's massive loan problems.
To compensate for the lack of supervisory resources over BCCI, bank regulators from the Cayman Islands, France, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom created a college of supervisors in 1987 to coordinate their regulatory efforts over BCCI.
2 3 In the end, this scheme was an unworkable solution and allowed supervisors to shift responsibility for any BCCI transgression among themselves. 24 No single supervisor had any incentive to supervise BCCI properly, and the supervisors did not cooperate adequately among themselves 25 in sharing information on BCCI operations. In a 2004 speech, Callum McCarthy, then head of the Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), concluded that "in some cases the resources [of a supervisor] are simply not up to the task of acting as a home regulator for a large group[j" and in the case of BCCI, "the resources then available in Luxembourg[J" the home regulator, were not sufficient. 
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS
Even before the current crisis, supervisory authorities were utilizing colleges as a tool to share prudential information on financial institutions with cross-border operations. 33 The EU has been particularly active in utilizing colleges to supervise financial institutions operating in multiple member states. 34 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors ("CEBS") 35 consists of the bank supervisory authorities of the EU member states and has the objective to "foster supervisory convergence across the Community." 36 In furtherance of this objective, CEBS has been active in supporting the development of colleges of supervisors of cross-border banks within the EU. 37 The financial crisis has focused renewed attention on colleges of supervisors as one of several tools to reduce risk within the international financial system. CEBS updated both documents in January 2009 and provided more specific detail on the operation of the college of supervisors. 40 In its Colleges of Supervisors-10 Common Principles,41 CEBS provides that a college of supervisors shall supervise any cross-border insurance group, banking group, or financial conglomerate. 42 The colleges-flexible, permanent fora for cooperation and coordination among financial supervisory authorities-shall have agreements in place describing the cooperation between the supervisors and the practical organization of the supervisory activities of the financial institution.
4 3 For banking groups, the consolidating supervisor, as defined in the amended Capital Requirements Directive ("CRD"), shall initiate the cooperation process.4 The colleges shall also promote harmonization of supervisory approaches and coordinate all major supervisory decisions. 45 In addition, the colleges shall plan and coordinate 38 id. 53 Previously, colleges of supervisors made all decisions by consensus and had no mechanism to resolve conflicts other than by negotiation and mutual cooperation. 54 At least with respect to supervisory authorities within the EU, the 2009 decision allowed CEBS to mediate these disputes.ss This decision also specifically required CEBS to "contribute to ensuring the efficient and consistent functioning of colleges of supervisors in particular through setting guidelines for the operational functioning of colleges, monitoring the coherence of the practices of different colleges and sharing best practices." 56 Now, CEBS is authorized to ensure that colleges of supervisors apply EU law, implement measures consistently across financial institutions, and ensure that cross-border banks are supervised consistently by colleges of supervisors with varying membership.s 7
The EU has taken additional steps to buttress colleges as a supervisory tool. 58 In several EU directives, the EU institutionalized greater cooperation among supervisors monitoring cross-border banks. 59 With the adoption of the Basel II directive dealing with capital requirements of credit institutions,60 the EU specifically created rules dealing with cooperation among supervisors of cross-border banks operating in the EU.61 In its proposal for Basel II,62 the European Commission noted that the establishment of colleges of supervisors would "facilitate the tasks of the consolidating supervisor and the host supervisors.6 Chapter 4 (Articles 124 through 144) of this directive provides rules to determine which supervisor, also known as the lead supervisor, 64 exercises consolidated supervision over the cross-border bank. Within Chapter 4, Articles 125 and 126 set forth detailed rules identifying the lead supervisor, depending on the structure of the credit institution and its relationship to any parent financial holding company.65 The membership of the college includes supervisors from all EU member states where the credit institution has a subsidiary.66 Article 126(3)-(4) provides that supervisors may waive these rules, appoint a lead supervisor selected among themselves to One weakness of the college of supervisors, under these directives, is the lack of a mandatory mediation process if the supervisors cannot agree on an action with respect to the supervision of the financial institution. As seen in the current financial crisis, this lack of mediation allowed supervisors to act on 72 their own and not in coordination with their peers. For example, in the fall 2008 rescue of Fortis, the financial group with investors in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 7 3 the national supervisors struggled to coordinate their actions. 74 At first, the Benelux governments purchased 49% of the common equity of Fortis.
75 A few days later, the Dutch government seized the Dutch operations of Fortis, and the Belgian and Luxembourgian operations 76 were sold to BNP Paribas, a private bank. These events illustrate a lack of effective supervisory cooperation, particularly during times of crisis. Recognizing the weaknesses in the supervisory system highlighted by the On February 23, 2009, the High-Level Group of advisors, chaired by Jacques de Larosibre, former Governor of the Banque de France, issued its report on the reform of the EU system of financial supervision, also known as the Larosibre Report. 79 Appointed by Jos6 Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, in the fall of 2008, the High-Level Group was charged with a broad mandate: "to make proposals to strengthen European supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors, with the objective to establish a more efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of supervision." 80 A complete analysis of this Report is beyond the scope of this Article, which will focus on the Report's recommendations related to supervisory cooperation within the EU. The Larosi&e Report recommended that the colleges of supervisors, introduced by the amended CRD and the then-proposed Solvency II Directive, should take the lead in supervising cross-border institutions. 81 The Report went on to suggest that colleges of supervisors should be strengthened by "participation of representatives of the secretariat of the Level 3 committees as well as of [ The Report also stated the "relatively restrictive use of supervisory colleges should be expanded immediately." 84 The Report suggested that by the end of 2009, supervisory colleges should be established for all major cross-border firms within the EU, estimated to be at least fifty financial institutions.86 The Level 3 committees8 would participate in this process by defining the final supervisory practices and arrangements for the functioning of the colleges of supervisors.
8 8 The clear intent of the Report is to expand the mandate of CEBS-to be more inclusive of the supervisory players and to broaden the tasks of colleges beyond those stated in the CRD. This recommendation is a logical precursor to the Report's medium-term goal of creating a European System of Financial Supervisors ("ESFS"). 89 The ESFS would transform the Level 3 committees into three supervisory authorities, one for each financial sector: banking, securities, and insurance.90 The authorities are tasked to ensure "consistency of prudential supervision" 91 and to define "common supervisory practices and arrangements for the functioning of the colleges of supervisors."92
The European Council of the EU93 took up the Larosi&re Report at its March 2009 meeting. 94 The European Council "agreed on the need to improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the EU and that the Report from the High-Level Group on financial supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosi&re is the basis for action." 95 In May 2009, the European Commission issued a communication describing its planned actions based on the Larosibre Report,96 calling for comments from interested parties during a consultation period, and setting forth a revision of the European supervisory structure based on two pillars: (1) the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council ("ESRC") to deal with macroprudential supervision and (2) the creation of the ESFS to deal with microprudential supervision, that is, supervision of individual financial institutions. 97 The ESFS is charged with developing a "harmonized core set of standards" 9 8 and "a common supervisory culture." 99 The Commission's legislative proposals go beyond the framework developed at the G-20 summits discussed below and create an integrated financial supervisory structure within the EU. 100 The Commission stated that the current Level 3 committees must move beyond being advisory bodies and should become European supervisory authorities with legal personalities and additional powers and responsibilities. 101 As part of the ESFS, the Commission proposed creating three new supervisory authorities-the European Banking Authority ("EBA"), the European Securities Authority ("ESA"), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority ("EIOPA"). 102 This Article focuses on the EBA. The May communication relies heavily on colleges of supervisors as "the lynchpin of the supervisory system" 110 as they will "ensur[e] a balanced flow of information between home and host authorities."" The EBA will participate in the colleges as an observer,112 Will ensure that colleges use consistent practices in supervising financial instructions,113 and will facilitate the distribution of microprudential information to all national supervisors in a particular college.114 The expectation is that the college will take an institutionwide view regarding prudential supervision, rather than just a national view. The European Commission highlights that the participation of the EBA in colleges is not a "'Europeanisation' of all financial supervision." 118 The ECOFIN Council stated that "a common supervisory culture" will be developed because of the EBA's participation in the colleges of supervisors.119 The EBA would collect microprudential information and create a central database of this information available to the relevant supervisors of a particular financial institution.120 The ECOFIN Council acknowledged the role of the 1 See id at 9 ("[T]he ESFS will combine the advantages of an overarching European framework for financial supervision with the expertise of local supervisory bodies."). In parallel to the legislation based on the Larosi&re Report, the EU considered and enacted changes to the Third Capital Requirements Directivel23 with respect to the formation of colleges of supervisors to supervise financial institutions operating across borders in the EU. The amended CRD requires consolidating supervisors to create colleges of supervisors.124 Under the CRD, colleges can exchange information about financial institutions, voluntarily delegate supervisory tasks and responsibilities among themselves, and develop a "supervisory examination programme[]" for the financial institution for which they are responsible.125 Members of the college are supervisors from a member state where a subsidiary is located or which contains significant branches of the financial institution.126 Previously, member states where significant branches were located did not have the right to participate in colleges of supervisors.127 The consolidating supervisor chairs the college, selects the participating supervisors, and notifies CEBS (or the EBA once it is created) of the college's activities, subject to any confidentiality agreements. At its December 2009 meeting, the ECOFIN Council did approve the three regulations creating the European supervisory authorities but with significant changes to the European supervisory authorities' powers. 132 In this Article, I focus on the changes in the regulation creating the EBA. 133 The ECOFIN Council's compromise significantly weakened the decision-making powers of the European supervisory authorities. Again, some member states, particularly the United Kingdom, were concerned about the possibility of an EU institution requiring the member state to use taxpayer money to bail out a financial institution against its will.134 Given London is the largest financial center in Europe, the United Kingdom was particularly concerned about this possibility.135 With these amendments, the ECOFIN Council authorized the European Presidency to negotiate with the European Parliament to enact legislation on first reading that would allow the European supervisory authorities to become operational sometime in 2010.136
This legislation does improve, to a limited extent, the financial supervisory system in the EU. As a result of the political compromise, the regulation has significant weaknesses and falls short of the goals set forth in the May communication and the Larosi&re Report. In particular, the compromise weakened the independence of the EBA. The EBA cannot issue a binding decision directly to a financial institution,145 a power the European Commission proposed and that is typical of national supervisory authorities.146 A declaration of a financial emergency by the ECOFIN Council triggers additional powers of the EBA.147 Under the Commission proposal, the European Commission could declare such an emergency.148 The directive includes a safeguard provision that weakens the EBA's power vis-A-vis member states and repeats the June 2009 statement by the ECOFIN Council that the EBA decisions should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of a member state in any way.149 A member state can appeal any decision of the EBA to the ECOFIN Council. 150 During the appeal, the EBA decision is not implemented. The ECOFIN Council must maintain the decision (e.g. take an affirmative action to approve it), or the decision is terminated.152 During an emergency declared by the ECOFIN Council, a member state may appeal an EBA decision to the ECOFIN Council and the decision is suspended. 153 If the ECOFIN Council does not revoke the decision, the suspension of the decision is terminated.154 Even then, a member state has the right to request the ECOFIN Council to re-examine its decision. ss Through the appeals process, the ECOFIN Council can overrule any decision by the EBA for any reason.156 While any EBA decision would generally be subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice, this review by the ECOFIN Council significantly undermines the independence of the EBA.
This regulation has not yet been finally enacted. Because the legal basis for the regulation is Article 95 of the Treaty of Lisbon, 157 dealing with the internal market, 158 it is subject to the co-decision procedure and must go before the European Parliament for approval.159 Promptly after the ECOFIN Council meeting in December 2009, four political parties that represent a vast majority of the members of the European Parliament issued a press release stating that they will not approve a "water[ing] down" of the financial supervision legislation.160 The European Parliament will likely propose some amendments to this compromise. In its first reading of the European Commission's May 2009 communication, the Parliamentary report commented that this legislation, and particularly the use of supervisory colleges, was "a phase in a development towards further regulatory convergence and supervisory integration." The G-20 leaders generally charged the FSB with assessing "vulnerabilities affecting the financial system," and then with identifying and overseeing actions to address them. 175 Related to colleges of supervisors, the FSB was tasked with "promot[ing] co-ordination and information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability" and "set[ting] guidelines for, and support[ing] the establishment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms." 176 In fact, twenty-eight colleges for systemically important institutions were in place by April 2009. While there is no official list of the most systemically important financial institutions, the Financial Times in November 2009 reported such a list, which follows the article as Annex B.
Meeting again in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, the G-20 leaders assessed progress on their previously agreed goals and noted an improvement in the world economy since they met in London. They expressed their resolve to ensure that the "regulatory system of banks and other financial firms reins in the excesses that led to the crisis" and "where reckless behavior and a lack of responsibility led to crisis, we [the G-20] will not allow a return to banking as usual." 179 The G-20 declared themselves to be "the premier forum for our international economic cooperation," 180 replacing the G-7 in that role. The G-20 noted the substantial progress achieved in establishing supervisory colleges and reinforcing international cooperation among supervisors. Furthermore, the G-20 recognized that solving cross-border insolvency of systemically important financial institutions must occur so that governments will be less likely to bail out institutions in order to prevent a collapse of the financial system. 182 In November 2009, the G-20 finance ministers met in St. Andrews to review progress thus far. 183 
CONCLUSION
Colleges of supervisors are not a complete solution for improved supervision of global financial institutions. However, they potentially could be a significant improvement in closing regulatory gaps and increasing information flow among home and host supervisors regarding systemically important financial institutions. Banks and other financial institutions operate in global markets, yet financial supervision is still conducted by national supervisors. The success of integrating European financial markets, particularly the wholesale markets, facilitated by the common currency, the euro, has highlighted the need for improved supervisory coordination among EU supervisors. However, colleges of supervisors are not supranational agencies. The possibility of a lack of accountability and "finger pointing" in the event of a bank failure or crisis is still present.
188 Participation in a college of supervisors does not prevent unilateral action by a national supervisor, as Colleges of supervisors are not decision-making bodies; rather, they are designed to share prudential information about a particular financial institution. The vast majority of communications among bank supervisors is currently bilateral, between two particular supervisors, not through colleges of supervisors. Typically, the information flows one way, from the host supervisor to the home supervisor. While the G-20 and the EU proposals on colleges stress twoway communications between supervisors, full cooperation among supervisors will be hindered because of the absence of a cross-border insolvency procedure for financial institutions. Since an orderly way to resolve the claims against a cross-border financial institution currently does not exist, supervisors must necessarily focus on protecting their national interests-the rights of residents within their jurisdiction who may have claims against a failing financial institution.
Various international bodies have issued principles and statements regarding the resolution of cross-border financial institutions, but none have yet been implemented. 190 The EU has issued a Directive on the Reorganization and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, 191 but the directive principally focuses on determining which national court has jurisdiction over the proceedings in a particular case rather than providing a complete, EU-wide system for resolving in an orderly manner the claims against a failing credit institution.192 Until such a regime is implemented, national governments are unlikely to relinquish their sovereignty over the resolution of claims against an insolvent financial institution. As seen in the creation of the European Banking Authority, the United Kingdom insisted on placing a brake on EBA decisions because of the possibility of a member state expending government funds to comply with an EU decision counter to the member state's public policy choice.19 While colleges of supervisors may improve the surveillance function over crossborder financial institutions by improving the flow of prudential information, true supervisory cooperation will not be realized until a credible, international regime for the resolution of financial institutions is designed and implemented.
Nevertheless, the creation of colleges of supervisors for all systemically important financial institutions is an improvement in financial supervision. Within the EU, the creation of these colleges of supervisors, with coordination by European supervisory authorities such as the EBA, may be a precursor to Europen-wide financial services regulation. However, until an international regime for bank insolvency is established, colleges of supervisors can only modestly improve the international framework for financial supervision. 
